This paper examines a novel motive for resource pooling in family networks in rural economies: to relax credit constraints and facilitate investment in non-collateralizeable assets for which credit market imperfections are most binding. We thus complement established literatures examining risk-sharing motives for resource transfers within family networks, as well as motives based on kinship tax obligations. We do so exploiting the Progresa program data, in which family networks can be identi…ed, households are subject to large exogenous resource in ‡ows, and detailed responses on consumption and an array of investments can be tracked in a household panel over …ve years. We …nd that for every dollar that accrues to the family network through Progresa transfers, food consumption expenditures increase by around 65c / for both households eligible for Progresa and ineligible members of the same family network. Hence the marginal propensity of families to invest/save out of every dollar is around 35, and we document how this is channelled towards easing credit constraints poorer network members face in …nancing non-collateralizable investments into their children's human capital. We show these consumption and investment bene…ts of being embedded within a family network are sustained …ve years after households …rst experience resource transfers from Progresa. Hence the interplay between resource in ‡ows and resource pooling by family networks can place network members on sustained paths out of poverty.
If the resources are invested, current consumption may decrease (but future consumption could increase as the returns to investment are realized. In general, the larger the increase in investment, the lower the increase in current consumption for both connected and isolated households.
To take these ideas to data, we exploit the experimental evaluation of the Progresa program, a large-scale anti-poverty policy intervention providing cash transfers to eligible (poor) households in rural Mexico. We empirically document the consumption and investment responses of connected and isolated households to the conditional cash transfers provided by Progresa, exploiting …ve features of the data.
First, we combine information on the paternal and maternal surnames of household heads and spouses, with the Spanish naming convention to construct family networks in each village.
Following the same procedure as our earlier work [Angelucci et al. 2010], we map extended family networks in 500 villages (encompassing over 20 000 households) in rural Mexico. This allows us to 2 Kinnan and Townsend [2012] and Karaivanov and Townsend [2014] are two exceptions in the literature that also jointly study consumption and investment decisions, doing so for Thai household-…rms for which rich panel data exists on both dimensions. They document the importance of kin groups for consumption smoothing and easing credit constraints to facilitate household investment. 3 Other forms of (in-kind) transfer within extended family networks have also been documented and studied, including those used to cement social ties (e.g. ceremonial payments), to pool labor, to share information on labor market opportunities, to create rotating savings and credit associations, and child fostering/adoption [Cox and Fafchamps 2008, Boltz-Lemmel 2013] . distinguish between connected households with a family network in the same village, and isolated households that have none of their family residing in close geographical proximity. 4 Second, we exploit the randomized research design used to evaluate Progresa: 320 villages were randomly assigned to be treated with Progresa, with the remaining villages retained as controls.
Following a partial population experimental design [Mo¢tt 2001 ], eligible and ineligible households are identi…ed in both treatment and control villages.
Third, eligible households in treated locations are subject to exogenous and large resource in ‡ows. The average monthly transfer to eligibles corresponds to 36% of their pre-program monthly food expenditures. More importantly, we document that family networks span eligibility status: some members are eligible while others are ineligible. Among connected and eligible households, over 80% of their extended family are also eligible. Hence extended family networks as a whole experience substantial resource in ‡ows due to Progresa: on average, these amount to the total monthly income of 60 households in the family network. Given the average network size is 75 households, the resource injection provided by Progresa is non-trivial, with the potential to foster large consumption and investment responses among network members if the family pools transfers.
These resource in ‡ows can enable some members to undertake non-collateralizable investments, Fourth, detailed panel data was collected on both food consumption and investment choices for over 20 000 households every six months pre-and post-intervention, something that remains rare among household panels [Karaivanov and Townsend 2014] . On investment, the data spans a rich array of assets varying in their collateralizability: from holdings of small livestock (such as poultry) for which credit constraints are unlikely to bind, through to entirely non-collateralizable forms of asset such as human capital.
Finally, we are able to study the longer term impacts of resource in ‡ows by exploiting a …nal wave of data from …ve years after households …rst experience receipt of transfers. This sheds light on whether the capacity of family networks to relax credit constraints causes sustained increases in investment, and as the returns to such investments are realized, then feedbacks into higher longer term consumption relative to isolated households.
Under standard assumptions the experimental research design identi…es: (i) the average treat-ment e¤ect (ATE) of resource in ‡ows from a comparison of eligibles in treatment and control villages; (ii) the indirect treatment e¤ect (ITE) of resource in ‡ows from a comparison of ineligibles in treatment and control villages [Angelucci and De Giorgi 2009] . We identify ATEs and ITEs for isolated and connected households. Finally, to exploit the full richness of our data we estimate impacts of exogenous resource in ‡ows at the level of the family network as a whole: this provides a network average treatment e¤ect (NATE) that summarizes how family networks respond to resource in ‡ows, irrespective of which household in the network experiences the resource transfer. We provide NATE estimates on mean consumption and investment, on consumption and investment inequality within networks, and provide novel estimates of how consumption and investment impacts vary with features of the family network architecture.
On consumption we document: (i) eligible connected households signi…cantly increase their food expenditures by 327pesos relative to connected households in control villages (this ATE corresponds to a near 23% increase in food consumption over its baseline level); (ii) ineligible connected households also signi…cantly increase in their consumption by 226pesos (this ITE corresponds to a 16% over baseline levels) relative to ineligible and connected households in control villages, thus providing direct evidence of resource pooling in extended family networks; (iii) among eligibles, the implied marginal propensity to consume (MPC) out of their own resource transfer is 691; among ineligibles the implied MPC to consume out of the transfer received per network member is 639. This implies that for every dollar that accrues to the family network as a whole, food consumption increases by around 65c / for both households in the network eligible for Progresa transfers and ineligible members of the same network. The implied marginal propensity of families to invest/save out of every dollar is thus around 35; (iv) the NATE estimates indicate consumption inequality within family networks does not change as poorer eligibles experience positive resource increases, consistent with household Pareto weights not changing over the study period.
In contrast, we …nd that eligible but isolated households have no statistically signi…cant change in their consumption relative to counterfactual isolated households in control villages. Although this impact is imprecisely estimated, it is signi…cantly di¤erent from the change in consumption of eligible connected households. Hence there is a need to also consider households' investment outcomes in order to move towards a more complete understanding of how isolated households utilize the resource transfer Progresa represents.
On investment, we …nd no signi…cant increase in collateralizable assets such as small animals (poultry) among isolated or connected households. This is as expected if there is a well-functioning credit market for such assets.
We …nd eligible isolated households use a signi…cant fraction of their resource in ‡ow to invest into cattle, as has been documented for rural Indian households by Rosenzweig and Wolpin [1993] .
Cattle are of intermediate collateralizability, and likely generate earnings from produce sales that co-vary less with their other income streams [Townsend 1994 , Bandiera et al. 2016 ].
In contrast, eligible and connected households signi…cantly increase non-collateralizable investments into human capital as measured by secondary school enrolment rates. In short, less collateralizable forms of investments are signi…cantly responsive to household resources, in line with Karaivanov and Townsend [2014] . We …nd: (i) eligible connected households signi…cantly increase their schooling investment by 75pp relative to counterfactual connected households in control villages (a 12% increase over the baseline level); (ii) eligible but isolated households have no such response, and the di¤erence between these impacts is highly signi…cant, despite isolated and connected households receiving similar resource in ‡ows and having the same baseline levels of secondary school enrolment. Given Progresa transfers are insu¢cient to cover the opportunity cost of secondary schooling, such non-collateralizable investments can only be undertaken by connected households because they are engaged in resource pooling arrangements with family members. These results closely match the …ndings of Kinnan and Townsend [2012] who report kin networks in Thailand facilitate large investment expenditures through the relaxation of borrowing constraints. Considering the family network as the unit of analysis, our NATE estimates then show that for the average connected household, secondary school enrolment increases by 60pp relative to counterfactual family networks in control villages. Finally, we examine the longer term impacts of family networks on consumption and human capital investments using the …nal wave of panel data from …ve years after the initial resource transfers. We …nd: (i) households embedded within family networks have monthly food expenditures that are 198pesos higher than for isolated households, corresponding to a 14% increase over baseline levels; (ii) the longer term gap in secondary school enrolment rates is sustained at 64pp, corresponding to just under 10% of the baseline levels. This suggests the interplay between large resource in ‡ows and resource pooling by family networks might well place them on sustained paths out of poverty and allow them to escape the kinds of poverty trap that have long concerned development economists.
The key contribution of the paper is to highlight an understudied channel for resource ‡ows within extended family networks: to foster investments into non-collateralizeable assets. This complements established literatures examining the role that family networks play in allowing households to smooth consumption in the face of idiosyncratic resource shocks, and the role that kinship taxes levied within such networks have on the allocative and productive e¢ciency of household decisions. Our paper also builds on earlier work studying Progresa. A third generation of study has exploited information on surnames to pin down social ties between households, and then used this to explore heterogenous treatment responses to Progresa.
Our earlier work, Angelucci et al. [2010] did so focusing only on schooling outcomes, and providing suggestive evidence of resource transfers within family networks facilitating such investments. In this paper we consider a richer set of consumption and investment outcomes. In particular our ITE impacts on consumption get to the heart of whether there is resource pooling within family networks or not. We then provide new estimates of consumption and investment responses at the network level, how inequality of consumption and investment in networks is impacted (over an array of asset investments varying in their collateralizability), and how both responses vary as a function of network architecture. The …nal innovation over the existing literature is to identify longer term impacts of being embedded within family networks on this set of consumption and investment outcomes. This is key to understanding the role that family networks can play in enabling members to escape poverty traps. 5 The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes a conceptual framework. Section 3 presents our context, data and empirical methods. Sections 4 and 5 cover the results on consumption and investment respectively. Section 6 examines longer term outcomes. Section 7 concludes by discussing further implications of our …ndings. 5 Angelucci and De Giorgi [2009] documented the existence of spillover e¤ects of consumption from eligible to ineligible households and identi…ed the likely channel through which this occurred, informal gifts and transfers. However, that paper used no data on family networks and did not study any speci…c institution through which these transfers occur. 6 We now describe how households' consumption and investment responses to Progresa di¤er depending on whether the household is isolated, in that none of their extended family reside in the same village, or whether they are connected, and so embedded within an extended family network in the same village.
Isolated Households
We recognize that isolated households may have extended family elsewhere and share resources with them. 6 However, in the context of responses to Progresa, it is important to note the evaluation data covers a period when the program was still being rolled out in villages across rural Mexico. For expositional ease, we describe the consumption and investment responses of isolated households to Progresa assuming there are no resource ‡ows with their extended family (that reside in other villages). We denote the per period resources, consumption and investment of isolated household () as  () ,  () and  () respectively (where  is used to denote that the household is isolated). We denote the savings of the isolated household as  () . Using the superscript  for eligibles, the following budget accounting identity holds for eligible isolated households:
All terms in (1) are de…ned at the household level. ¢  () corresponds to the resource injection due to Progresa that eligible isolated households experience, and is detailed in Section 3: this increase is of course partly conditional on changes in school enrolment by households. For some households, they may need to reduce consumption to use any transfer to send their children to 6 For example, many Mexican households receive migrant remittances from overseas. However, this is far less the case in the Progresa sample of rural households: for example, Angelucci [2015] documents that in 1998, fewer than 1% (4%) of households in control villages report having a member migrated to the US (elsewhere in Mexico). 7 On the importance of private information for resource transfers in the context of risk sharing: (i) Ligon [1998 ] develops an empirical test showing that private information plays an important role in shaping the allocations in village economies in Indian data; (ii) Kinnan [2014] develops a test to distinguish between hidden income, limited commitment and moral hazard as motives for incomplete informal insurance. Using household panel data from rural Thailand, limited commitment and moral hazard are rejected, while there is empirical support for the predictions of hidden income. secondary school. An increase in resources can increase investment by relaxing credit constraints. This is especially so for lumpy, non-collateralizable assets (such as large livestock and education), which are harder to borrow against, than more liquid forms of investment (such as small livestock), for which credit markets likely exist. Consumption may increase, decrease, or remain unchanged depending on the e¤ect on investment.
The core analysis in Sections 4 and 5 documents the consumption and investment responses to Progresa of eligible isolated households:
, where the former corresponds to the marginal propensity to consume out of Progresa transfers. Finally, we note that our analysis does not focus on the third term, the changes in savings that eligible isolated households experi- (1), but to highlight that resource in ‡ows can be channelled towards consumption and investment purposes, the balance between the two might di¤er between isolated and connected households, as might the forms of investment undertaken by both types of household. 8 
Connected Households
Connected households are embedded within family networks in the same village, and these networks are assumed to pool resources across members. The underlying motives for such redistribution can relate to consumption smoothing, kinship taxes, or to foster investment, and the objective of networks is to maximize the sum of utilities of their members. The relevant unit of analysis is the family network as a whole, denoted (). In family networks the following budget accounting identity holds:
where the total resource injection to the family network, ¢ () , sums Progresa transfers across eligible members of the family, denoted  2 ()  , while on the right hand side we sum over all network members (both eligibles and ineligibles). The total resource in ‡ow to family networks is detailed in Section 3: this increase is of course partly conditional on changes in school enrolment by all eligible households in the network. As with isolated households, absent resource pooling in the family network, some connected households may also need to reduce consumption to use 8 For ineligible isolated households, the LHS of (1) is obviously zero, so that consumption and investment responses can only occur if Progresa causes general equilibrium e¤ects in goods or asset markets. This is testable and something we address below.
any transfer to send their children to secondary school. Thinking through the right hand side highlights three key empirical implications of resource pooling arrangements in family networks.
First, because of resource pooling, there can be consumption responses to Progresa by ineligible households in the extended family, i.e.
 0 where we use the superscript   to denote an ineligible member of the family network of an eligible household, (). Without a fully speci…ed micro-founded model of network behavior, we have an ambiguous prediction on the relative change in consumption of eligible and ineligible connected households, i.e.
. These two consumption responses correspond to the ATE and ITE of Progresa, estimated in Section 4.
Comparing budget accounting identities (1) and (2) also makes clear there is no prediction of the relative consumption responses of eligible isolated and connected households.
The novel motive for resource pooling in family networks is that it enables member households to undertake certain investments they could not otherwise self-…nance in the face of imperfect credit markets. Investments into assets that are lumpy and non-collateralizable are especially likely to be aided by resource pooling within extended family networks because there is no credit market to invest in such assets (non-collateralizability) and individual households cannot accumulate enough savings alone to make such investments (lumpiness). The …rst implication of (2) is thus to examine the investment responses to Progresa over a variety of assets that vary in their collateralizability: the ATE and ITE impacts of Progresa on investment are presented in Section 5. Together, these shed light on whether resource pooling enables richer or poorer households within the network to undertake additional investments.
Finally, to exploit the full richness of our data we estimate impacts of Progresa at the level of the family network as a whole:
. This provides a network average treatment e¤ect (NATE) that summarizes how family networks a¤ect consumption and investment responses to resource in ‡ows among their members, irrespective of which household in the network experiences the resource transfer. We provide NATE estimates on mean consumption and investment, on consumption and investment inequality within networks, and provide novel estimates of how both impacts vary with features of the family network architecture. 9 In family networks with only one eligible member, the change in resources (at the network level) is the same as for isolated households. Hence there should be no di¤erence in their investment choices. However, we cannot separately study this subsample of networks because as the descriptives below make clear, the large majority of networks have at least two eligibles in them. Hence when we restrict the analysis to connected households that are the only eligible household in their network, given the small sample sizes involved it is unsurprising that the impacts on consumption and investment are not precisely estimated (and so the …nding that such connected households also have no signi…cant increase in their investment is not a very powerful test of the intuition above).
3 Context, Data and Methods
Context
Progresa is a large-scale government intervention providing cash transfers to poor households conditional on children's attendance at school, and mother's attendance at health facilities. An experimental research design was implemented to evaluate Progresa: the evaluation involved collecting panel data on 20 000 households every six months in 503 villages between March 1998 and November 1999. The evaluation took place while the program was being scaled-up across villages in rural Mexico. Villages were selected into the evaluation sample if they were su¢ciently poor.
Credit markets are highly imperfect in this setting, providing scope for extended family networks to play an important role in household's consumption and investment decisions.
To detail the kinds of credit market imperfection prevalent in rural Mexico, we note that in the third wave of data (November 1998) households were asked about the sources and uses of loans/transfers: only 28% households report having outstanding loans, and less than 1% report having access to formal credit. Among those using formal loans, 66% of households report using them to …nance investment into livestock, agriculture or businesses. In contrast, among those using informal credit, 76% of households report using such loans to …nance consumption and other emergencies. 10 To understand whether Progresa transfers could be used to …nance investments into noncollateralizable assets, we note that while the average monthly transfer to eligibles is non-negligible, corresponding to 35% of pre-program monthly food consumption expenditures, this magnitude remains far below what is required for households to self-…nance non-collateralizable investments into human capital: for example, Schultz [2004] …nds that the value of transfers corresponds to between one half to two thirds of the full time child wage in the survey villages; De Janvry and Sadoulet [2006] argue that transfers correspond to around 40% of what children of the same age would earn. In either case, the transfers do not fully compensate for foregone earnings of secondary school aged children employed full time in the labor market.
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In the pre-program period households were asked the main reason why children did not attend 10 In other low income settings, such informal arrangements have been documented to include the use of statecontingent informal loans [Udry 1994], or gifts and other quasi-credit arrangements [Platteau 1997]. 11 Relatedly, Todd and Wolpin [2006] note that to the extent that children engage in work in family enterprises/farms, the opportunity cost of their labor is not even the market wage but their marginal product in family enterprises/farms: that is even harder to measure. Finally, Attanasio et al.
[2011] also present evidence suggesting the opportunity cost of schooling is not fully o¤set by the value of transfers: more precisely they document using a structural model, that a revenue neutral change in the program that would increase the grant for secondary school children while eliminating for the primary school children would have a substantially larger e¤ect on enrollment of the latter, while having minor e¤ects on the former.
school: for those with children aged between 6 and 18, 39% cited a lack of …nancial resources, and a further 11% cited needing the child to work or help at home. Hence if multiple households in the same family network were to be in receipt of Progresa transfers, and these households pooled resources, it would be possible for them to channel resources towards some network members and enable such investments into non-collateralizable assets to occur.
Of the sampled villages, 320 were randomly assigned to receive Progresa from May 1998, and 183 were assigned as controls. Two pre-program survey waves were conducted (October 1997, March 1998). The other waves occur post-intervention (November 1998, May 1999, November 1999). To study the longer term impacts on consumption and investment outcomes of connected versus isolated households, we exploit a …nal wave of data from November 2003. Finally, we match our panel data to administrative records detailing the potential and actual transfers provided to each household. Table A1 describes the key variables and survey waves used. 12 In 1997 households were classi…ed as either being eligible (poor) or ineligible (not poor) for Progresa transfers according to a household poverty index, designed to give relatively greater weight to correlates of permanent rather than current income. Around three quarters of households are classi…ed as eligible: as shown later, this implies the typical family network will have many eligible members. 13 The transfers correspond to exogenous increases resources to eligible households, with uncertainty as to whether transfers would be available beyond 1999.
In family networks, we observe eligibles and ineligibles. This allows us to measure whether the consumption responses of households in a network are the same irrespective of which network member received the transfers (
); and for non-collateralizable investments, to examine whether poorer (eligible) or richer members of the network are able to undertake such investments when their network experiences resource in ‡ows (
). There is variation in the monetary value of transfers households (and therefore networks) are eligible for depending on a non-linear relationship with the demographic composition of children pre-program: transfers conditional on school enrolment are larger for higher school grades, and for girls within any given grade. 14 
Constructing Family Networks
To identify the extended family links between households in the same village we use the same procedure described in Angelucci et al. links between siblings can also be identi…ed. For example, the heads of households B and C are identi…ed to be brothers if they share the same paternal and maternal surnames. We impose the following restrictions when de…ning family links: (i) inter-generational links exist when the relevant individuals have at least 15 years age di¤erence, and no more than 60 years age di¤erence between mother and child; (ii) intra-generational links exist when the individuals have at most 30 years age di¤erence.
We thus identify households with at least one …rst-degree relative in the village, as well as the entire network of …rst-degree relatives. Hence all the households in Figure 1 would belong to the same …rst-degree extended family network, even though some are …rst cousins, or linked across two generations. Figure 1 shows all households to be couple headed to ease the exposition.
To deal with the 15% of households that are single headed we use additional information on the gender of the head to identify family links. Although such single headed households are then used to construct the extended family networks, we focus our analysis of consumption and investment outcomes on the 85% of households that are couple-headed. 18 There are of course limits to our algorithm. For example, two households headed by cousins will not be recorded as belonging to the same extended family unless both sets of parents are present. Angelucci et al.
[2010] provides more descriptive evidence on surnames in this setting, and provides external validity to the created links using data from the Mexican Family Life Survey (MxFLS). More precisely, we show how the number of …rst-degree relatives rural households have alive in any location, as recorded in the MxFLS, compares, on average, to the number of relatives our algorithm suggests reside in the same village for rural households. 19 
Networks
Panel A of Table 1 shows that 80% of households are connected, so have at least one other extended family member heading their own household in the village. Thus 20% of households are isolated in that none of their extended family members reside in the same village. There are on average 75 members in each family network, highlighting the potential importance of informal resource pooling arrangements within families. Our analysis among connected households is based on 1379
(817) unique family networks in treatment (control) villages covering 10559 (6471) households.
Consumption and Investment at Baseline
Panel B of Table 1 presents data on food consumption, measured in adult equivalents. Food consumption is based on seven day recalls over 36 food items (Table A1 provides further details).
Monthly food expenditures are 144pesos. Given a daily poverty line of $125, 70% of households lie below this threshold if we aggregate per capita food and non-food expenditures. Figure 2A shows the distribution of daily per capita expenditures across couple headed households pre-program.
This reiterates the absolute poverty these households experience, and the fact they lack resources to …nance many forms of investment.
Panel C focuses on household investments, split between livestock and schooling. The collateralizability of such assets varies between these extremes depending partly on the transactions costs lenders face in reselling assets used as collateral in the case of borrower default. To recognize this continuity in asset collateralizability, among livestock we consider the division between investments in small animals (chickens, rabbits, pigs and goats) and larger animals (donkeys, horses, cows and oxen). Over 80% of households own some form of small livestock, typically poultry. The thick market for such assets makes small livestock highly collateralizable. In contrast, only around On entirely non-collateralizable human capital investments, primary enrolment rates are above 90% for households at baseline, so that most choose to send their children to school even absent Progresa. In contrast, secondary school enrolment rates are lower, at around 65%. Hence this 20 Fafchamps and Pender [1997] estimate a structural model of irreversible investment decisions and …nd that poor farmers fail to undertake pro…table investments that they could in principle self-…nance, because the nondivisibility of these investments makes it infeasible to self-…nance. Rosenzweig and Wolpin [1993] also emphasize the irreversibility of investment as leading to the choice of investments into bullocks rather than irrigation equipment. We can think of this as being another important di¤erence between small and large livestock.
is the relevant margin of schooling investment choice. As the value of transfers is insu¢cient to o¤set credit constraints related to this investment, for poorer (eligible) connected households, the ability to pool resources within the family network is key for such investments to be undertaken.
Column 3 in Table 1 shows tests of equality between connected and isolated households for each characteristic. At baseline, the two types of household are not signi…cantly di¤erent on most dimensions, suggesting they have similar preferences over consumption and investment. It is plausible that the Progresa program is the …rst time the majority of households in these communities simultaneously experience a large increase in resources, and thus allow resource pooling families to overcome borrowing constraints and spark non-collateralizable investments. To see if this can be studied using the experimental research design of Progresa, Columns 4 and 5 show that within connected and isolated households, the samples are mostly balanced on outcomes across treatment and control villages. Hence we can exploit the randomization to identify the causal impact of resource in ‡ows on connected and isolated households. The exception is for primary enrolment rates between connected and isolated households, albeit the absolute di¤erence is small (93% versus 91%). To account for any pre-treatment di¤erences in household preferences for schooling, we thus control for the household's primary school enrolment rate at baseline when estimating investment responses related to human capital outcomes (secondary schooling and child labor).
Transfers
We now describe data from administrative records on Progresa transfers that we match to the main household panel. The …rst row in Panel D shows that just over 70% of households are eligible. On the availability of transfers from extended family members, among connected and eligible households, over 80% of their extended family are also eligible. For ineligible (hence less poor) households, just over 50% of their extended family are eligible: that this share is lower for ineligibles is unsurprising given there is less variation in permanent income within than across extended families.
The remaining rows in Panel D show the value of these potential transfers to connected households, measured in survey wave 3 (November 1998). Potential transfers are those that would accrue to eligible households if they perfectly complied with the program's conditionalities. If we assume such transfers are not shared with others, the average potential transfer available per adult equivalent in eligible households is 53pesos per month. The next row considers the other case where potential transfers are spread evenly across all family network households: in this scenario the average potential transfer available per adult equivalent in connected households is 39pesos per month. Column 3 con…rms there are no signi…cant di¤erences between connected and isolated households in terms of their eligibility status or the value of transfers they can potentially receive.
Nor do we …nd any signi…cant di¤erence in the value of potential transfers available to connected and isolated households. 21 To benchmark the magnitude of these transfers, we …rst note that potential transfers represent around 36% of food consumption expenditures for eligible isolated and connected households. If we consider family networks in which transfers are spread evenly across eligibles and ineligibles, the potential transfers available per household correspond to 27% of the value of household food consumption (in adult equivalent terms). If the potential transfers from Progresa were entirely used for consumption, 15% of eligible households could be moved above the poverty line, as shown by the second distribution in Figure 2A ; taking into account potential per capita resource transfers from eligible network members, then 14% of connected but ineligible households could be moved above the poverty line, as shown by the third distribution in Figure 2A (noting that ineligibles have higher levels of consumption to begin with).
As Progresa transfers are conditional on children's regular school attendance and given high baseline enrolment rates, most eligibles would receive transfers even absent any change in enrolment behavior. Such de facto unconditional cash transfers of course provide an income e¤ect that enables households (connected or isolated) to raise consumption and investment without any change in actual schooling behavior.
On the actual value of monthly transfers received, we …nd that: (i) transfers accruing to connected and isolated households are: for example in survey wave 3 (November 1998) they correspond to 119 (112) pesos for connected (isolated) households; (ii) between November 1998 and November 1999 (survey waves 3 to 5), the value of actual transfers received correspond to around 11-18% of the value of household food consumption. We can also benchmark these actual transfers against household and network levels of monthly income. For example, household monthly income among eligible connected (isolated) households is 1232 (1286) pesos. Hence, for connected eligibles, actual Progresa transfers correspond to the total monthly income of 10% of eligible households in the family network. Given networks on average contain 75 households of which many are eligible, this again shows the resource injection provided by Progresa to be non-trivial. In short there is scope for networks to experience resource in ‡ows large enough so as to help some of their members to overcome binding credit constraints on non-collateralizable investments. 22 21 We use the equivalence scale estimated by Di Maro [2004] from the same data. This sets a scale of one for members 18 or older, and .73 otherwise. We use the monthly Bank of Mexico CPI series to de ‡ate monetary values. 22 Household income is de…ned as labor income (summed over all household members), plus income from informal activities, pension receipts, interest and payments from rentals, plus any other source of income. All …gures cited are measured in November 1998 (survey wave 3). Focusing …rst on the response of eligible couple-headed households (  = ) to the resource in‡ow Progresa provides, we estimate the following OLS di¤erence-in-di¤erence speci…cation, where we superscript the coe¢cients of interest with the eligibility status of households:
Empirical Method
X 0 includes baseline characteristics of the head, household, and village, and standard errors are clustered by village (the level at with Progresa operates) to capture common shocks across households. We consider changes in consumption and investment over the same period, utilizing surveys from March 1998, May 1999 and November 1999. Our working sample of eligibles for consumption outcomes covers over 10 000 households in these survey waves.
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As take-up is near universal, estimating (3) among eligibles,  Table 1 shows the eligibility, consumption and investment characteristics of connected and isolated households to be well balanced at baseline 23 Although in the very long run we expect family networks to adjust through marriage, mortality and migration, our analysis treats networks as …xed. 24 X 0 includes the following controls (measured at baseline): age of the household head, household size by age brackets (0-7, 8-14, 15-19, more than 19), the standardized household wealth index, village marginalization index, and region dummies. To account for one imbalance at baseline we additionally control for the household's primary school enrolment rate at baseline when we consider investment outcomes. We do not utilize data from the third survey wave (November 1998) as in many treated villages, the program had only just started operating in some treated locations, and was not fully operational in other treated villages. Including this data wave thus leads to slightly less precision in some estimates, and this cannot be properly dealt with absent administrative records detailing the exact time at which transfers began to be implemented in each treated village. For comparability, we use the same waves of data for our baseline consumption and investment results. However as Table A1 details, consumption speci…cations could also be run using the …rst wave of data (October 1997) and the results are qualitatively unchanged if we do so. across treatment and control villages.
These ATE estimates for isolated and connected households measure the causal impact of resource shocks on consumption and investment. The di¤erence between the two ATE estimates (  3 ) is informative of the causal impact of being connected relative to being isolated when resources increase, under the additional assumption that being connected (  = 1) is uncorrelated with unobservables driving   . While Table 1 previously suggested there are few di¤erences on observables between both household types, this di¤erence is less central to our analysis. We focus predominantly on the main ATE estimates that exploit only the randomization and identify how households with a given family structure respond to resource in ‡ows. Finally, we note that for consumption outcomes we can derive the implied marginal propensity to consume out of the household's own resource in ‡ow by dividing the ATE estimate (as consumption outcomes in (3) are in levels), by the actual transfer received by the eligible household, where both are measured in peso adult equivalents:
To understand whether the consumption and investment outcomes of connected but ineligible 
The …nal stage of empirical analysis for consumption and investment outcomes exploits the full richness of our data and estimates impacts of resource increases at the level of the family network as a whole: hence the unit of analysis is network  in village  in wave . Recall that there are around three family networks per village, and we focus on those networks with at least one eligible household within them. We then estimate an OLS di¤erence-in-di¤erence speci…cation analogous to (3) but aggregated to the level of each network:
where the network level controls X 0 are those used in the core analysis, but averaged at the network level. These estimates are based on a working sample of over 1600 family networks across the same three survey waves described above. We refer to the estimated parameter of interest, b   1 , as the network average treatment e¤ect (NATE). Of course, when   is the network average of the earlier household outcomes considered,
then the NATE is a weighted average of the ATE and ITE estimates for connected households. However, estimating (6) allows us to investigate beyond mean impacts and also consider how resource increases to the network impact consumption inequality within networks.
Consumption

Direct E¤ects on Eligibles
We …rst present our …ndings on consumption following the three-step sequencing described above.
Column 1 of Table 2 considers the sample of eligible households (  = ) and presents ATE estimates from (3), measuring how eligibles are impacted by their own increase in resources. This shows that for food consumption expenditures: (i) eligible isolated households have an increase of 129pesos in their consumption relative to counterfactual eligible and isolated households in control villages: while this di¤erence is not statistically signi…cant, it is not precisely estimated either, so that we cannot rule our relatively large consumption responses of eligible isolated households to Progresa; (ii) connected households signi…cantly increase their consumption by 327pesos relative to connected households in control villages; (iii) the di¤erence in these ATE estimates between connected and isolated households is signi…cant at the 1% level ( b   3  0), despite both types of household having similar levels of food consumption at baseline and receiving similar valued potential transfers (as Table 1 showed). 30% of received transfers are channelled to alternative uses among connected households. We later examine the extent to which resource pooling within families allows connected households to undertake non-collateralizable investments. For isolated households, given the weaker consumption response to transfers, it is vital to consider investment outcomes to obtain a more complete picture of how such households choose to utilize the resource in ‡ow Progresa represents. 25 
Indirect E¤ects on Ineligibles
Column 2 in Table 2 Comparing the ITE and ATE estimates for connected households, we cannot reject the null that these are the same size, although the ATE point estimate is 44% higher than the ITE.
Comparing the implied MPCs in Columns 1 and 2, we again see a striking similarity between how on the margin, eligible and ineligible households convert additional resources into consumption: the MPC derived from the ATE is 691; the MPC derived from the ITE is similar at 639. In short, 25 this implies that for every dollar that accrues to the family network as a whole, this leads to a 65c / increase in food consumption and this e¤ect is similar for eligible and ineligible households in the network. This is clean evidence in favor of resource pooling within the extended family network, that has not previously been documented in the context of Progresa. Figure 2B graphs how the distribution of food consumption expenditures are shifted for both eligibles and ineligibles, and that a substantial share of both sets of households are brought above the global poverty line by the interplay of the program and resource pooling by extended families.
Network E¤ects
We now focus on the family network as the relevant unit and estimate (6) for networks with at least one eligible household in them. The parameter of interest,   1 , is identi…ed exploiting the experimental research design. Table 3 presents the results. Column 1 shows that average food consumption in family networks in treatment villages is 156pesos higher than in such networks in control villages, a signi…cant di¤erence at the 5% level.
Column 2 shows the e¤ect of resource increases on network consumption inequality, as measured by the standard deviation in cross sectional log consumption in the network,   =sd(log   ) 2() .
This shows family networks in treated villages have the same levels of inequality as counterfactual networks in control villages. Given the assumed underlying objective of family networks is to maximize the sum of utilities across their members, the result suggests this does not entail changes in consumption inequality within the network. This result has two important implications: …rst, it shows that in the short run, family networks partially undo transfer programs aimed at assisting the poor. Indeed, if all households were in a family network, transfer-based poverty programs would have little impact on short run inequality. Second, the result suggests the Pareto weight of connected households is unchanged over the study period.
Finally, we explore how the architecture of family networks impacts consumption responses.
To do so, we estimate (6) allowing for an interaction between the Progresa dummy (  ) and network characteristics (  ). We …rst consider network size, as it has been argued that in some cases larger networks can better smooth consumption [Munshi and Rosenzweig 2016] . We split family networks into those above/below the median size and summarize our …ndings in the …rst panel of Figure 3A . This shows the earlier e¤ects are largely driven by larger family networks (despite the average transfer per adult equivalent being the same in small and large networks): in treated villages, the response in mean food expenditures is 269pesos, that is signi…cantly greater than the response among smaller than median sized networks in the same village.
The remaining panels of Figure 3A 
Investment
Direct E¤ects on Eligibles
To fully characterize household responses to resource in ‡ows, we now analyze investment outcomes.
We …rst present ATE estimates from (3) using eligibles, considering three types of investment: those into small livestock (e.g. poultry) that can be thought of as highly collateralizable, those into childrens' human capital in the form of secondary schooling, that are considered to be of low collateralizability, with investment into larger livestock (e.g. cattle) somewhere between these extremes. As Table 1 showed, given that rates of livestock ownership are over 80%, there is not much scope for the extensive margin for such investments to change. Hence we consider the impacts of resource increases on the peso value of owned livestock. We do so for over 9 000 (7 000) eligibles when examining small (large) livestock investments. We measure secondary school investment as the share of 11-16 year old children in the household that are attending school, de…ned for 5 800 eligibles that have children aged 11-16.
Column 1 of Table 4 shows that for small livestock: (i) neither eligible isolated nor connected households have any signi…cant change in the value of owned livestock relative to counterfactual households in control villages; (ii) the di¤erence in these ATE estimates between connected and isolated households is not signi…cant ( b   3 = 0 p-value = 55). Hence as expected, resource in ‡ows to households have no impact on such collateralizable investments because credit market imperfections are not so severe that such forms of investment cannot be …nanced. To gauge whether the magnitude of the impact on isolated households by November 1999 is plausible, we note that the 887peso increase in the value of cattle owned corresponds to around 46 months worth of transfers the median isolated household would have received up until then. By considering investment outcomes, we are able to explain the otherwise puzzling weak consumption response of eligible isolated households to resource in ‡ows documented in Table 2 . More precisely, these investment responses to Progresa by isolated households are consistent with the lack of a statistically signi…cant consumption responses documented in Table 2 : isolated eligible households use their transfers to buy large livestock, since, presumably, it is di¢cult for them to …nance such investments through loans (recall that less than 3% of all households report having outstanding loans at baseline).
Moreover, such investments likely generate earnings streams from the sales of livestock produce that are less correlated to other income streams. 27 Of course, if negative resource changes have symmetric e¤ects on isolated households, then these …ndings link to Rosenzweig and Wolpin [1993] , who …rst identi…ed that larger draft animals are sold o¤ by households in economic distress, and validates the theoretical concern raised by Chetty and Looney [2006] that the ability of households to smooth consumption does not imply there are zero welfare costs of income risk.
2829
Column 3 repeats the analysis for investment into secondary schooling. We …nd a starkly di¤erent pattern of responses from those into livestock, that indeed more closely resembles the ATE impacts for food consumption: (i) isolated households that experience a resource in ‡ow have no signi…cant change in their secondary school enrolments relative to isolated households in control villages; (ii) connected households signi…cantly increase their schooling investment by 75pp
relative to counterfactual connected households in control villages (corresponding to a 12% increase over the baseline level); (iii) the di¤erence in these impacts is signi…cant at the 1% level despite both isolated and connected households receiving resource in ‡ows of similar amounts and having the same levels of secondary school enrolment at baseline (Table 1) . Given the value of Progresa transfers is insu¢cient to cover the full opportunity cost of secondary schooling, such non-collateralizable investments can only be undertaken by connected households rather than iso- 27 In support of this, we note that 50% of heads of isolated households report being a daily wage laborer as their main occupation pre-program. Such workers face the highest income earnings volatility relative to other occupations in agrarian economies, with earnings generated from livestock produce considered to be among the least volatile [Townsend 1994 , Bandiera et al. 2016 . Hence there would be a desire among these households to diversify income streams towards those arising from livestock. 28 The important issue raised by Chetty and Looney [2006] is that if households are highly risk averse then consumption smoothing might be achieved through behaviors that reduce household's long run welfare, such as taking children out of school or selling productive assets. Hence, focusing exclusively on how consumption responds to idiosyncratic income shocks is insu¢cient to fully characterize the welfare costs of income risk. Rosenzweig and Wolpin [1993] long provided evidence of precisely this type of interlinkage for rural Indian households: they show when farm pro…t realizations are low, such households are forced to sell o¤ bullocks to smooth consumption. 29 To check for suggestive evidence that isolated households indeed have higher consumption variability that connected households and so might be more vulnerable to shocks, we regress the longitudinal standard deviation of log (consumption) of a household, constructed over all waves of data, on a dummy for whether the households is connected and isolated households. Doing so we …nd the coe¢cient on being connected is ¡013 with a standard error of 004. lated households because they are engaged in resource pooling arrangements with extended family members. This build on the evidence presented in Angelucci et al. [2010] that …rst highlighted a potential for resource transfers within family networks to …nance schooling investments. These …ndings also neatly complement those of Rosenzweig and Wolpin [1993] and Fafchamps and Pender [1997] that both document in the context of India, how rural households are observed investing into cattle but not in higher return but non-collateralizable and lumpy investments in irrigation.
To probe further whether the impacts on human capital investments re ‡ect relaxed credit constraints, Column 4 considers household responses in terms of child labor: the share of children aged 11-16 that households report as having worked in the week prior to the survey. This result matches with the earlier …nding for schooling: (i) there is no reduction in child labor among eligible isolated households in response to resource in ‡ows; (ii) eligible connected households signi…cantly reduce the incidence of child labor by 36pp relative to counterfactual households in control villages.
Taking the schooling and child labor results together suggests when connected households have more resources, they prefer to reallocate their children away from work (and thus choose to give up some income) and towards investing in their childrens' human capital. 30 Table 5 This lack of spillover e¤ect to ineligibles suggest the large injection of resources that Progresa provides at the village level does not alter the marginal net bene…t of making such livestock investments, and so these are independent of household, network or aggregate resources.
Indirect E¤ects on Ineligibles
Repeating the analysis among ineligibles for schooling investment in Columns 3 and 4: (i) we continue to …nd no evidence of general equilibrium e¤ects through the null response of isolated households; (ii) we also …nd muted investment responses among connected ineligibles. Hence if family networks share resources, they do so in a way that allows poorer network members, and hence eligible for Progresa, to increase non-collateralizable investments into human capital.
Resource transfers that ‡ow from eligibles to ineligibles within the network are largely spent on food consumption, as shown in Table 2 . It is rational for schooling investments of poorer networks members to increase, rather than among less poor (ineligible) members: if the former do so, they increase the value of conditional cash transfers received, while this is not the case if ineligibles increase their schooling investment. 31 Finally, Column 4 investigates the incidence of child labor among ineligibles: we …nd no signi…-cant di¤erence in child labor between treatment and control villages of either isolated or connected households. This …nding suggests the program does not have spillover e¤ects through labor markets. The close to zero impact among connected and ineligible households ( b   3 = ¡009) suggests their children do not substitute for the reduction in child labor among eligible households in their family network documented earlier.
Considering together the ATE and ITE estimates on schooling are informative of changes in inequality in human capital investments within family networks in response to resource in ‡ows.
At baseline, eligible and ineligible connected households have similar levels of secondary school enrolment, 64%. Hence the resource increase that eligibles experience allows them to overtake the investments made into human capital by less poor ineligibles in their family network. This is in contrast to the earlier result for consumption inequality within family networks, that was unchanged in response to signi…cant resource injections into networks due to Progresa.
Network E¤ects
To complete the investment analysis, we estimate (6) focusing on the family network as the relevant unit. Table 6 presents the results for networks with at least one eligible household in them. On collateralizable investments, Column 1 rea¢rms there is no signi…cant increase in the value of small animal investments as a result of the network experiencing a positive injection of resources.
Column 2 shows a similar pattern of null responses at the network level on the value of larger forms of livestock (recall the earlier positive ATE results on large animals in Table 4 were driven by isolated households who are not included in these NATE estimates).
Column 3 focuses on schooling investments and here we see relative to counterfactual networks 31 in control villages: (i) for the average network member, secondary school enrolment rates increase by 60pp. In short, resource pooling arrangements among family networks can overcome credit constraints into non-collateralizable investments only if the network as a whole experiences a su¢ciently large resource increase. Column 4 considers the impact of resource in ‡ows to child labor in family networks as a whole and shows the reduction in the incidence of child labor of 61pp is close to equal and opposite the magnitude of the increase in schooling (60pp).
Finally, Figure 3B exploits information on network architectures to see how the investment responses vary with the architecture of the family network. We see an intriguing pattern of responses to be considered in conjunction with the network responses for consumption shown in Figure 3A : (i) there are signi…cant impacts on school enrolment for networks above and below the three statistics considered: the size of the network, its diameter, and its group closeness centrality;
(ii) however in each case, within treatment villages, the response of those networks above the median is smaller than those below the median. Viewed alongside Figure 3A , this illustrates the interlinkage between consumption and investment choices for family networks subject to resource in ‡ows. Larger and more dense networks that appear to have the greatest consumption response among their members are also those with marginally smaller investment responses.
Consumption and Investment in the Longer Term
We have documented how resource pooling in family networks allows for the relaxation of credit constraints for non-collateralizable investments such as those into the human capital. As the returns to such investments are realized, this has long term impacts on consumption for connected households relative to isolated households. To assess these longer term gains we exploit the …nal wave of household panel data collected in November 2003, …ve years after the …rst Progresa transfers were made in treated villages. From late 1999 onwards the experimental evaluation ended and the program was rolled out over all control villages. Hence when using this longer window of analysis into the post-evaluation period, it is useful to de…ne a dummy ¦  = 1 if village  was originally randomly assigned to receive Progresa in 1998, and ¦  = 0 otherwise. We then estimate the following speci…cation for household  in village :
where ¢  is the change in consumption/investment outcome from March 1998 and November 2003,   is a dummy for whether household  is connected or not, and X 0 includes the same set of characteristics as before. We continue to cluster standard errors by village. The coe¢cient of interest,  3 , measures the di¤erence-in-di¤erence in outcomes between connected and isolated households (irrespective of their original eligibility status), from having been treated for the full …ve years relative to the short run e¤ects documented earlier. Table 7 presents the results from tracking 14 000 households over this …ve year period.
On consumption, Column 1 shows that households embedded within family networks have monthly food expenditures that are 198pesos higher than for isolated households: recall that at baseline, there were no signi…cant di¤erences in food expenditures between connected and isolated households. This impact corresponds to a 14% increase in adult equivalent food expenditures over baseline levels. It is plausible that this re ‡ects the returns to human capital investments being realized within the …ve-year window given secondary schooling lasts three years in this setting, and the perceived and actual returns to secondary schooling are substantial [Attanasio and Kaufmann 2014]. As Progresa transfers have the largest marginal impact in shifting children into secondary schooling then there could well be large productivity impacts because of the program, that feed into this magnitude of higher household resources in the longer term.
The remaining Columns examine if investment outcomes di¤er in the longer term between connected and isolated households. Columns 2 to 6 show no di¤erential impact on livestock investments between isolated and connected households, for neither small nor large animals. This suggests: (i) the credit market for small livestock is well functioning; (ii) any gains to isolated households in being able to invest more into larger animals seem to be short lived: perhaps because such assets are liquidated when they later face a negative resource shock, as documented for rural Indian households by Rosenzweig and Wolpin [1993] .
Column 6 examines non-collateralizable schooling investments: we see a signi…cant di¤erential impact between connected and isolated households: as Table 1 showed, at baseline these households had secondary school enrolment rates of 65% and 66% respectively. These longer term results
show that this gap grows by 64pp, corresponding to just under 10% of the baseline levels, …ve years after households and their network members begin experiencing exogenously timed resource in ‡ows. Two points are of note. First, the result suggests that connected households do not reverse decisions to invest in their childrens' human capital over this …ve year time frame. Second, within-village inequality in investments in the human capital of secondary school-aged children increases because of resource pooling within family networks.
We note that these longer term di¤erentials also vary with the intensity with which households experience positive resource shocks from Progresa. Consider the simple division of households between those above and below the median number of children aged 0-14 in the household at baseline: those households eligible with more children should receive greater valued transfers all else equal. In line with this we …nd the di¤erential impact on food expenditures and secondary school investment of resource shocks between connected and isolated households with above the median number of children at baseline to be larger: the longer term impact on food consumption is 34pesos (corresponding to a 24% increase over baseline levels), and the impact on schooling is 99pp (around 15% of the baseline level).
As in Gertler et al.
[2012], we …nd that connected households do not converge back to preprogram poverty levels over this horizon. This suggests the interplay between resource in ‡ows, and resource pooling to foster investment within family networks might enable them to escape the kinds of poverty trap that have long concerned development economists [Lewis 1954 ]. This is counter to the predictions of the literature highlighting kinship taxes as a key motive for within family resource transfers: such taxes lead to productive and allocative distortions, and thus can be a root cause of poverty traps.
Conclusion
This paper studies a novel motive for resource pooling in family networks in village economies: to relax credit constraints and facilitate investment, especially those in non-collateralizeable assets for which credit market imperfections are most binding. While there is an established literature examining risk-sharing motives for resource transfers within family networks, as well as motives based on obligations related to kinship taxes, our innovation is to examine the consequences of resource sharing on investment outcomes. We do so by exploiting the Progresa experimental evaluation data, in which extended family networks can be identi…ed, households are subject to exogenous and large resource in ‡ows, and detailed responses on consumption and an array of investments can be tracked in a panel of households over the long term. Our key …ndings show consumption and investment responses of households to resource in ‡ows depend fundamentally on whether or not they are embedded in extended family networks. This has implications for consumption outcomes across all networks members, the nature of assets invested into, and the longer term trajectory out of poverty for the network as a whole.
Our contribution is empirical. However, our …ndings highlight there remains enormous scope for developing models of decision making within networks, that would properly micro-found the conceptual framework discussed. Key modelling aspects might be to: (i) jointly study consumption and investment decision; (ii) embed multiple motives for resource pooling into models (rather than studying risk insurance, kinship tax, and investment motives separately); (iii) consider how network architecture determines outcomes.
The role of policy when households engage in informal resource sharing arrangements has been Notes: *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%. The unit of observation is a household in survey wave t, and the sample in Column 1 (2) covers all eligible (ineligible) couple headed households in 503 villages. The number of households refers to the number observed in the first wave of data used, wave 2 (March 1998). The dependent variable is the adult equivalent monthly food expenditures (in pesos). The sample covers consumption data from waves 2 (March 1998), 4 (May 1999) and 5 (November 1999). OLS regression estimates are presented, where standard errors are clustered by village. Connected households are those that have at least one family member living and heading their own separate household in the same village. In all specifications we include the following controls (as measured at baseline): age of the household head, household size by age brackets (0-7, 8-14, 15-19, more than 19), the standardized household wealth index, village marginalization index, and region dummies. As the sample includes only eligible households and take-up is close to 100%, the reported coefficients correspond to average treatment effects (ATE). In the lower half of the Notes: *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%. The unit of observation is an extended family network in survey wave t, and the sample covers all networks with at least one eligible household in 503 villages. The number of extended family networks refers to the number observed in the first wave of data used, wave 2 (March 1998). The dependent variable in Column 1 (2) is the mean (standard deviation of the log of) adult equivalent monthly food expenditures (in pesos) across households in the extended family network. The sample covers consumption data from waves 2 (March 1998), 4 (May 1999) and 5 (November 1999 Notes: *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%. The unit of observation is a household in survey wave t, and the sample covers all eligible couple headed households in 503 villages. The number of households refers to the number observed in the first wave of data used, wave 2 (March 1998). In Column 1, 'small' livestock includes chickens, rabbits, pigs and goats. In Column 2, 'large' livestock includes donkeys, horses, cows and oxen. This division of livestock is based on physical size. Prices for livestock are taken from wave 2 (March 1998) at the village level, replacing missing values with municipality averages. The dependent variable in Column 3 is the share of children aged 11-16 that are resident and enrolled in secondary schooling. The dependent variable in Column 4 is the share of children aged 11 to 16 that households report as having worked in the week prior to the survey. The sample covers investment/child labor data from waves 2 (March 1998), 4 (May 1999) and 5 (November 1999). OLS regression estimates are presented, where standard errors are clustered by village. Connected households are those that have at least one family member living and heading their own separate household in the same village. In all specifications we include the following controls (as measured at baseline): age of the household head, bins for household size by age brackets (0-7, 8-14, 15-19, more than 19), the standardized household wealth index, the village marginalization index, and region dummies. In Columns 3 and 4 we also control for the household's primary school enrolment rate at baseline. As the sample includes only eligible households and take-up is close to 100%, the reported coefficients correspond to average treatment effects (ATE). Notes: *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%. The unit of observation is a household in survey wave t, and the sample covers all ineligible couple headed households in 503 villages. The number of households refers to the number observed in the first wave of data used, wave 2 (March 1998). In Column 1, 'small' livestock includes chickens, rabbits, pigs and goats. In Column 2, 'large' livestock includes donkeys, horses, cows and oxen. This division of livestock is based on physical size. Prices for livestock are taken from wave 2 (March 1998) at the village level, replacing missing values with municipality averages. The dependent variable in Column 3 is the share of children aged 11-16 that are resident and enrolled in secondary schooling. The dependent variable in Column 4 is the share of children aged 11 to 16 that households report as having worked in the week prior to the survey. The sample covers investment/child labor data from waves 2 (March 1998), 4 (May 1999) and 5 (November 1999). OLS regression estimates are presented, where standard errors are clustered by village. Connected households are those that have at least one family member living and heading their own separate household in the same village. In all specifications we include the following controls (as measured at baseline): age of the household head, bins for household size by age brackets (0-7, 8-14, 15-19, more than 19), the standardized household wealth index, the village marginalization index, and region dummies. In Columns 3 and 4 we also control for the household's primary school enrolment rate at baseline. As the sample includes only ineligible households, the reported coefficients correspond to indirect treatment effects (ITE). Notes: *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%. The unit of observation is an extended family network in survey wave t, and the sample covers all networks with at least one eligible household in 503 villages. The number of extended family networks refers to the number observed in the first wave of data used, wave 2 (March 1998). In Column 1, 'small' livestock includes chickens, rabbits, pigs and goats. In Column 2, 'large' livestock includes donkeys, horses, cows and oxen. This division of livestock is based on physical size. The dependent variable in Column 3 is the share of children aged 11-16 that are resident and enrolled in secondary schooling. The dependent variable in Column 4 is the share of children aged 11 to 16 that households report as having worked in the week prior to the survey. All outcomes are averaged at the family network level. The sample covers investment/child labor data from waves 2 (March 1998), 4 (May 1999) and 5 (November 1999). OLS regression estimates are presented, where standard errors are clustered by village. Connected households are those that have at least one family member living and heading their own separate household in the same village. In all specifications we include the following controls averaged at the network level (as measured at baseline): age of the household head, household size by age brackets (0-7, 8-14, 15-19, more than 19), the standardized household wealth index, village marginalization index, and region dummies. In Columns 3 and 4 we also control for the household's primary school enrolment rate at baseline. Notes: *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%. The unit of observation is a long difference in the outcome variable within the same household, and the sample covers all couple headed households in 503 villages. The dependent variable in Column 1 is the adult equivalent monthly food expenditures (in pesos). Small livestock includes chickens, rabbits, pigs and goats. Large livestock includes donkeys, horses, cows and oxen. This division of livestock is based on physical. The dependent variable in Column 2 (4) is a dummy for the ownership of small (large) livestock. The dependent variable in Column 3 (5) is the value of small (large) livestock owned. The dependent variable in Column 6 is the share of children aged 11-16 that are resident and enrolled in secondary schooling. The sample covers consumption and investment data from waves 2 (March 1998) and 8 (November 2003) . OLS regression estimates are presented, where standard errors are clustered by village. Connected households are those that have at least one family member living and heading their own separate household in the same village. In all specifications we include the following controls (as measured at baseline): whether the household is connected or not, whether it was assigned to an original Progresa village or not, and the interaction between the two; household controls include the age of the household head, bins for household size (0-7, Figure 2A , all couple headed households (eligible and ineligible) are included. The additional distributions then include the per capita resources potentially available to eligible households from Progresa , and those potentially available to ineligible households through resource transfers originating from eligible members of their extended family network. In Figure 2B , all couple headed connected households (eligible and ineligible) are used. The figure shows the distributional impact on eligible households of the ATE of their own positive resource shock, and the distributional impact on ineligible impacts of the ITE of their family members receiving resources, and redistributing them within the family network. The figures show heterogeneous NATE estimates across networks with above/below the median of a given characteristic: Figure  3A shows these effects where food consumption expenditures, and Figure 3B shows them for secondary school enrolment rates. The three network characteristics considered are: (i) the network size (namely, the total number of households in the family network); (ii) the diameter of the network (namely, the maximum distance from one household to another in the network); (iii) the closeness of the network as measured by group closeness centrality index. For each characteristics we show the NATE impacts above and below the median of each statistic (as calculated over all family networks with at least one eligible household in them), as well as the difference between the two NATE estimates. On each bar, *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%. 
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